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A bstract. In this paper we discuss the methodology and results of testing 
the Java Card applet firewall mechanism. The main motivation for this work 
is the complexity of the firewall. Given the complexity, non-compliance of 
the cards with respect to the official specification is not unlikely. Firewall 
implementation faults may lead to serious security issues. Although we did 
not discover any serious problems on our test cards, a few minor specification 
violations are reported. We only found one specification violation on one card 
that could be considered unsafe, in that it might introduce a security risk 
for specific applications.
1 O verview
During investigations of Java Card Virtual Machine security w.r.t. ill-typed byte­
code (to be reported in [9]) we considered the Java Card firewall mechanism as 
one of possible ways to sneak in ill-typed code onto the card. During our tests we 
realised th a t the firewall mechanism by itself may offer possibilities to break card 
security if not implemented correctly. We also realised tha t the Java Card firewall 
specification [11, Chapter 6] may not be obvious to  interpret at places (although we 
have to say tha t we did not find serious ambiguities in the specification). Moreover, 
there have been substantial changes to the specification along with the introduction 
of logical channels in version 2.2 of Java Card.
One more reason for taking the firewall specification under the scope is to be 
able to create a formal model of the firewall for the KeY system [2] to complete 
our recent work on the verified Java Card API reference implementation [8]. Our 
earlier work show tha t the official specifications cannot always be fully relied on 
when rigorous formalisation is considered. In [5,4, 7] we reported on ambiguities in 
the Java Card specification and formalisation difficulties in the context of the Java 
Card transaction mechanism. In the end we tested some cards and built the formal 
model partly based on the official specifications (where non-ambiguous) and partly 
on the actual behaviour of cards (where the specification was not clear or simply 
underspecified). A natural step before constructing a formal model of the firewall 
mechanism is to assess the compliance of cards w.r.t. the official specification. This 
allows to catch the precise semantics of the firewall checks.
All in all, we decided to  construct a comprehensive Java Card firewall mechanism 
test (soon to be available from authors' webpages) to see how faithfully the cards 
follow the specification and whether there are some non-compliant behaviours that 
could be exploited to break card security. Although in principle the answer to the 
latter is “no” , we did discover small deviations from the specification. We describe 
the interesting and relevant parts of the specification together with the test results 
in Section 4.
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1.1 R elated  W ork
Some deficiencies of the Java Card firewall mechanism were already pointed out 
in 1999 [6,10]. Then in [1] a system based on higher order logic (the Coq theo­
rem prover) has been proposed for verification of applet isolation properties, i.e. 
firewall properties. Later in 2004, a type system to statically verify absence of fire­
wall violations was proposed [3]. (While such static verification has the advantage 
of detecting problems earlier, at compile time, for security having checks at run­
time has its advantages, because one does not have to trust code being statically 
checked.) Since then, we are not aware of any work on either testing or formalising 
the Java Card applet firewall mechanism. Apart from scientific research, commercial 
companies engage in Java Card compliance testing. A notable example here is the 
JCWorkBench tool from Riscure1 which allows to  test cards w.r.t. many aspects 
of the Java Card platform, including the applet firewall. In fact, we communicated 
with Riscure during our work, reported our test results to them and also consulted 
their tests for specific test ideas.
We ran our firewall tests on a set of test Java Cards. In total we tried eight 
different cards from four manufacturers:
— A_211 and A_221 from Manufacturer A, implementing Java Card 2.1.1 and 2.2.1 
respectively,
— B_211, B_22, and B_221 from Manufacturer B, implementing Java Card 2.1.1,
2.2, and 2.2.1 respectively,
— C_211A and C_211B from Manufacturer C, both implementing Java Card 2.1.1,
— D_211 from Manufacturer D, implementing Java Card 2.1.1.
However, it was not possible to  run our tests on all of the cards. Cards C_211A and 
C_211B refused to install our test applets, most likely due to  picky on-card bytecode 
verifier th a t prohibits the use of shareable interfaces altogether. Card D_211 also 
refused to install our applets for reasons still unclear. Finally, all cards except one 
(D_211) should be considered newer generation cards, regardless of the API version 
they implement.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives background infor­
mation about the firewall mechanism, Section 3 briefly describes our test suite. In 
Section 4 we discuss parts of the firewall specification relevant for our test results 
and point out non-compliant behaviours we discovered in our test cards. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 T he Firew all M echanism
The Java Card firewall mechanism [11, Chapter 6] provides a means to guarantee 
separation of applet data on the card. It prevents an applet from unwanted inter­
ference from another applet tha t could be made possible by it leaking a reference 
to some internal data structure or exposing some instance field as public. Every ap­
plet running on the card has a security context assigned to  it, however, more than 
one applet can reside in one security context. Subsequently, all objects on the card 
belong to some security context. The context of a given object is assigned during 
object creation and is inherited from the owner of the object (i.e. the applet). The 
object access rules are established by the currently active security context. That is, 
an object can be accessed (e.g. field access, method call) only if the current running 
context is the same as the security context of the object. Any attem pt to access 
data outside of the context results in a S ecu rityE xcep tion .
1 http://www.riscure.com
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Obviously there are some exceptions from the above mentioned rule. To begin 
with, the Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE) has a special system privilege,
i.e. it can read data from any security context regardless of any other rules. That 
is, basically none of the access rules apply if the currently running context is the 
JCRE context. Large parts of the Java Card API code runs in the JCRE context, 
making them  a potential source of security problems, as discussed below.
Then, to enable data exchange between applets, and also accessing system owned 
data, the mechanism of shareable interfaces and context switching is provided. In 
short, an applet (the client) can request (through specific API calls) a shareable 
interface object from another applet (the server). Once the server grants the ac­
cess, the client receives an object th a t belongs to the server and tha t implements 
some methods defined in some shareable interface (a regular Java interface that 
extends a special tagging S hareab le interface). Then the client has the right to 
invoke methods defined in the interface on the server’s object. During every such 
method invocation a context switch happens. Before the method is called, the cur­
rent context is tha t of the client, during the shareable method call the context is 
switched to the server, and after the method is finished the context is restored back 
to the client.
To enable the applet to access certain JCRE data, so called system entry points 
are provided: JCRE owned instances of special classes tha t can be accessed from 
any context. In particular, any context can access system owned instances of the AID 
class and the APDU object. Again, when methods are invoked on entry point objects, 
a context switch happens, each such method executes with the JCRE privilege. At 
this point it is very im portant for the API to establish tha t the client does not try  
to bypass the firewall. In particular, any references th a t are passed to  such a JCRE 
privileged method do not have to necessarily belong to the client context. Thus, 
each JCRE method should verify the received references against the client context.
Furthermore, the entry points are divided into permanent and tem porary ones. 
References to permanent entry point object can be stored in instance fields, while 
tem porary cannot. JCRE owned AID objects are permanent entry point objects, the 
APDU object is temporary.
Finally, global arrays provide one more way to share data between contexts. 
Global arrays are accessible from any context. There are only two global arrays in 
the whole Java Card system: the installation buffer and the APDU buffer. Global 
arrays are also temporary, i.e. their references cannot be stored in instance fields.
On top of the above mentioned rules there are some special cases and exceptions. 
Most im portant are:
— Logical channels interact with the firewall mechanism: access to shareable inter­
face object is forbidden if the server applet is selected on another logical channel 
[11, Section 6.2.8.6].
— Clear-on-deselect arrays are subject to additional access rules as described in 
[11, Section 6.1.5] and Section 4.5.
— Public static fields do not really belong to any context and thus are accessible 
from any context. Furthermore, public static methods can be called from any 
context without causing a context switch [11, Section 6.1.6]. Hence public static 
fields tha t are not f i n a l  constitute a potential security risk and should never 
be used.2 (Static fields tha t are f i n a l  are constants, so cannot be tampered 
with from the outside.)
Obviously, in addition to these firewall rules, the regular Java access rules (pri­
vate/protected access, etc.) apply during compilation time.
2 In fact, given that visibility attributes such as public and protected are not checked 
at runtime, all static fields that are not f in a l constitute a potential security risk. A 
sensible programming guideline would be to forbid these.
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3 T he T est Program
As stated already, the main purpose of testing the firewall is to establish cards’ 
compliance w.r.t. the rules we described in the previous section, and assess any 
security risks tha t may result from non-compliant behaviour.
To thoroughly test the firewall we have a set of test applets on the card and a 
dedicated terminal application:
— The terminal application sends simple APDUs to the card, tha t in turn  invoke 
tests on the card. The card replies with the test result which is then reported 
by the terminal to the user in human readable form.
— There are three applets on the card and one library package. The library pack­
age defines some shareable interfaces tha t the test applets use and some class 
definitions tha t are used in the tests.
Two of the test applets reside in one package, and the third applet resides in 
another package. The first package needs two applets to  test the compliance 
w.r.t. two different applets th a t share the same security context. The third 
applet obviously serves to  test the communication across the firewall.
Our tests methodically cover the firewall rules defined in [11, Chapter 6]. In 
particular there are tests to check tha t all firewall access rules are followed, that 
contexts are switched and reported according to expectations, tha t entry point 
objects follow their special rules and preserve security, and th a t all other special 
rules we mentioned in the previous section are considered.
Each single test can result in the following ways:
— If a given access attem pt should be permitted, then obviously a successful access 
is a test pass. A S ecu rity E x cep tio n  indicates a test failure.
— If a given access attem pt should not be permitted, then a S ecu rity E x cep tio n  
(or some other exception specified for a given access rule, e.g. System Exception) 
indicates a test pass. A successful access attem pt clearly indicates a test failure.
— Each test can result in an exception other than the one mentioned (or lack 
thereof) by the specification. This again indicates a test failure.
4 T est R esu lts
In this section we describe test results for tests tha t we either think are interesting 
for some reason or tha t exhibit some card’s non-compliance. None of the failed tests 
seem to open serious security holes in a Java Card implementation. Some cards are 
not fully compliant to  the specification, but typically in ways tha t are harmless, in 
the sense th a t they do not introduce security risks, and even very unlikely to cause 
problems with compatibility or portability. Only one case of non-compliance that 
we found -  card A_221 ignoring the restriction on access via a shareable interface 
when the applet is active on another logical channel, as described in Section 4.6 -  
could be consider a security problem, in th a t the card is more permissive than the 
specifications allow.
4.1 “D irect” O peration  on  Shareable O bjects
The Java Card specifications implicitly assume th a t methods of shareable interfaces 
are invoked on shareable object acquired through the shareable interface mechanism 
of the Java Card API, in the following way:
AID a = JCSystem.lookupAID(servAID, (short)0 , (byte)servAID.length); 
SInterface sio  =
(SInterface)JCSystem.getAppletShareableInterfaceObject(a, (byte)0);
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where S In te rfa c e  is an interface type tha t extends Shareable. This way the static 
type of the acquired object is always some shareable interface. Then, because of 
static type limitations, it is only possible to invoke methods of tha t interface (i.e. 
with the in v o k e in te rfa c e  opcode). Moreover, the object in question can be only 
cast to shareable interfaces it implements, and not to any class types.
It is, however, possible to acquire a shareable object with a static type different 
from the defined shareable interface. This is possible to achieve by getting the 
object directly from another context through a public static method, following this 
scenario:
public class SomeClass implements SInterface {
void method1() { / /  declared in  S Interface, which extends Shareable 
}
}
public class ServerApplet extends Applet {
/ /  sc belongs to  ServerApplet, but is  Shareable 
SomeClass sc = new SomeClass();
/ /  normal way of giving away the shareable in terface
public Shareable getShareableInterfaceObject(AID clAID, byte param) { 
re tu rn  sc;
}
/ /  " s ta tic "  way of giving away the shareable in terface  
public s ta t ic  SomeClass getSomeClass() { 
re tu rn  sc;
}
}
public class ClientApplet extends Applet {
SomeClass o = ServerApplet.getSomeClass();
o.method1(); / /  Should th is  be possible? Specification  says n o ...
}
(We made one presentation shortcut here. Technically the getSomeClass method 
cannot be placed in the ServerA pplet package, but it is possible to achieve the 
same effect with this method residing in a separate library package.) In this case 
the static type of the object can be any type between O bject and the actual runtime 
(dynamic) type of the object, exactly as in the example. (Here the dynamic type of 
o is SomeClass.)
The question now is whether it should still be possible to access shareable meth­
ods of this object o. According to the rules defined in the specification it is forbidden 
[11, Section 6.2.8.4] -  the static type of the reference tha t a method is invoked on 
(here o) statically has to be of a shareable interface type [11, Section 6.2.8.6]. On 
the other hand, if we know tha t we deal with a shareable object and we implicitly 
know the shareable methods, it might be possible to call those methods directly 
“on the whole” (so to  say) object o, i.e. the o .m ethod1(); call could be legal.
All the cards required the static type of a shareable object to be the shareable 
interface before any methods could be called.
4.2 Q uerying th e  Shareable Status
According to the specification it is not possible to check if an object is an in­
stance of the S hareab le  interface if th a t object belongs to a different context
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[11, Section 6.2.8.10].3 All cards but one (A_221) indeed prohibit such a check -  
a S ecu rity E x cep tio n  is thrown. A_221 simply returns f a l s e  instead. Note that 
both behaviours give the same overall result: we can find out if the object is share­
able or not, just the result is reported in a different way. However, strictly speaking, 
the second behaviour is not compliant with the specification.
4.3 P riv ileged  A P I M ethods
The purpose of this test was to find out whether it is possible to convince privi­
leged API methods to read data outside of the context of the client calling such a 
privileged method. Although it was not possible to break the security this way the 
test revealed some slight differences in the implementation of some API methods 
(notably eq u a ls  methods of the AID class). Let us look at the first method:
public boolean equals(Object o);
The checks tha t this method has to do are the following:
— firewall check: if the caller of the method does not have the right to access o, i.e. 
the caller context is different from the context of o, then a S ecu rity E x cep tio n  
should be thrown;
— instance check: if object o is not of type AID then f a ls e  shall be returned;
— AID comparison: if the firewall allows access to o and o is of type AID then the 
actual comparison of the AID bytes takes place.
Performing the first two checks in a different order can produce a different result. 
We have indeed observed these different behaviours on different cards: for a non­
AID object belonging to another context passed to  the eq u a ls  method, some cards 
(A_221, A_211, B_22) give a S ecu rity E x cep tio n , while other cards (B_211, B_221) 
return f a ls e .  We consider the second behaviour non-compliant, because it lets an 
applet check if an object th a t belongs to another context is an AID object or not (but 
nothing more). Again, although this seems harmless, this is not compliant to the 
specification. The documentation of the eq u a ls  method says th a t the method will 
throw a S ecu rity E x cep tio n  “if o object is not accessible in the caller’s context” . 
Although this by itself does not require the firewall check to  be the first one, another 
part of the specification forbids applets to check instances of objects belonging to 
other contexts [11, Section 6.2.8.8].
The implementation of the second eq u a ls  method in the AID class:
public boolean equals(byte[] bArray, short o ffse t, byte length);
also shows some implementation differences between the cards, although here truly 
harmless. The two checks th a t can be made in an arbitrary order are (i) the firewall 
check for the byte array bArray, (ii) whether the le n g th  parameter is equal to the 
AID length stored in the object. A_211 checks the length first, all the other cards 
do the firewall check first. Note tha t doing the second check first does not reveal 
any information about the byte array bArray, but it can reveal information about 
the length of the AID (which is a byte array) being queried. However, this can be 
legally checked anyhow with the getB ytes method.
4.4 R eported  E xceptions on  Array A ccess ou tsid e o f th e  C ontext
Practically all firewall violations should manifest themselves with a S e c u r ity -  
Exception, with the notable exception of a specific scenario described in the next
3 This in itself seems to be circular logic.
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section, when a clear-on-deselect array is created, and a System Exception should be 
reported. One of the cards (A_211), however, reports a wrong exception on attem pt 
to access an array belonging to another context. Instead of a S ecu rity E x cep tio n  
a System Exception is reported. This again is a violation of the specification, but a 
safe one, in tha t it does not introduce any security risk.
4.5 C lear-on-D eselect Arrays
Transient arrays tha t are cleared on applet deselection are required to behave in 
a certain way: access to (or creation of) such arrays is only allowed if the current 
context is the context of the currently selected applet. In particular it means that 
an object (applet) cannot access its own clear-on-deselect array when the object 
is not running in the context of the currently selected applet. (The motivation for 
this restriction is tha t the contents of such arrays should be regarded sensitive, as 
this is the reason to making them  clear-on-deselect.) This situation occurs when 
the applet’s method is invoked from the primary context after a context switch 
through a shareable interface. This rule also applies even if the attem pting context 
is selected on another logical channel.
All the cards behave accordingly to these rules. However, one card (A_221) ex­
tends this rule to clear-on-reset arrays when a creation of an array is attempted. 
That is, clear-on-deselect arrays cannot be accessed or created (as stipulated by the 
specification), while clear-on-reset arrays can be accessed (correct behaviour), but 
cannot be created (incorrect behaviour). Again, this violation is safe (in fact one 
could argue tha t it introduces more security), nevertheless limits the functionality 
of the card.
4.6 M u ltiselectab le A p p lets and Specification  R edundancy
The newer Java Card specification (2.2 onwards) can make use of the mechanism 
of logical channels. More than one applet can be selected at the same time on 
different logical channels. This applies to applets within the same package/context, 
but also to  applets in different packages/contexts. Because of this possibility some 
addition firewall restrictions are included in the specification. Notably, access to 
a shareable interface is forbidden if the context of the object being accessed (the 
server object) is active on another logical channel [11, Section 6.2.8.6]. One of the
2.2.x cards (A_221) ignores this rule and grants the access regardless of whether the 
server applet is active on another logical channel or not. Note th a t this is potentially 
dangerous, in th a t it could lead to a security problem for a particular applet, even 
though this does not seem very likely. All other 2.2.x cards (B_22, B_221) respect 
this rule.
Then, note tha t if this rule is properly implemented, then one of the com­
ments [11, Section 6.1.5] in the Java Card specification becomes redundant. The 
comment states tha t the clear-on-deselect array access rules we discussed in Sec­
tion 4.5 “also apply even if the attem pting context is selected on another logical 
channel” . That is, the rule is extended to multiselectable setting. The only scenario 
(that we can think of) to violate the rule from Section 4.5 is when the method 
tha t accesses a clear-on-deselect array is called through a shareable interface. Then, 
because of the context switch, the current context is not the same as the context of 
the currently selected applet. In the multiselectable scenario the shareable interface 
method call is forbidden in the first place, thus the clear-on-deselect array access 
in the multiselectable scenario should never happen. Thus, the comment mentioned 
above seems obsolete. The only other way to violate the rule is when JCRE accesses 
the array. For JCRE, however, the access is always granted following the statem ent
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in [11, Section 6.2.3]. Although this issue can be seen as a simple specification re­
dundancy (which in some cases is good) it also can lead to confusion, which in turn  
may lead to faulty implementations.
Finally, the newest Java Card specification (2.2.2) also enforces a similar rule [11, 
Section 6.2.7.2] when the acquiring (apart from accessing) of a shareable interface 
is attem pted -  getting a shareable object is forbidden if the server applet is selected 
on another logical channel. None of the cards we tested enforce this rule, but they 
do not have to as none of the cards implement the 2.2.2 specification. It would be 
very interesting to see if 2.2.2 cards4 enforce this rule.
4.7  Stack Overflow
One of our tests checks to see whether the current context is not corrupted by a 
stack overflow (the idea for this particular test was borrowed from JCWorkBench 
tests). This was tested by causing an infinite recursive method call. All but one card 
behaved properly by throwing an error and restoring the initial context. The one 
card (B_22) seems to  have strange control over stack overflows: upon stack overflow 
the card terminates with the status word 6F0C and there is no error or exception 
tha t can be caught. In this case it is not possible to  actually establish whether 
context information is maintained properly, but it is clearly no longer an issue as 
execution is halted.
4.8 O ther
Finally, there is a publicly available emulator for A_221. This emulator behaves 
exactly the same way during the firewall test as the actual card.5 This suggest 
tha t it is a true emulator, one tha t actually runs the same API implementation as 
the actual card. (Then the interesting question is whether the API implementation 
could be extracted/decompiled from the emulator.)
5 C onclusions
Our testing of the Java Card firewall revealed only minor issues where implemen­
tations did not comply with the specification. Most of them were ‘safe’ violations 
of the specs, in th a t they would not introduce any security risks. They might have 
a negative impact on interoperability/portability, although we do not think this is 
very likely to occur in practice for the issues we found.
The only ‘unsafe’ violation of the specifications we found was card A_221 ignoring 
the restriction on access via a shareable interface when the applet is active on 
another logical channel (Section 4.6). This does not immediately result in security 
problems, but it could lead to security problems in particular applications tha t use 
shareable interface.
All this suggests th a t test suites used in development are incomplete, and also 
tha t the Technology Compatibility Kit (TCK) for Java Card, the official test suite 
to determine compliance to the standard, can be improved. It is a pity tha t the TCK 
is not public (it is only available to Java Card licencees), as it means we cannot see 
how we could contribute to its improvement.
It is also clear tha t there are places in the specification tha t allow different 
interpretations (e.g. in which order the checks in the A ID .equals method should be
4 We are aware of one such card, but it was not possible to get access to it.
5 The behaviour is so accurate that even direct reading of reference values, as described 
in [9], give similar results.
8
done). It is, however, a bit disturbing tha t a seemingly straightforward specification 
is not really implemented correctly by many of the cards. Although the problems 
we discovered are harmless, they question Java Card platform interoperability. This 
in turn  puts a question on the sense of developing a formal model of the firewall. If 
the formal model based on the official specification does not reflect the actual card 
behaviour, then it cannot be used for sound proofs of Java Card program security 
w.r.t. firewall properties in a real-life setting.
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